By David Tulis
Today Arthur Jay Hirsch filed in Lawrence County, Tenn., circuit court this motion for dismissal of his case due to lack of jurisdiction. For the sake of this mild-mannered Christian man, a lover of liberty should hope for a favorable ruling from that court’s judge, Stella Hargrove. Serving the state’s interest is district attorney Kim Helper in the Franklin office of the attorney general. The trial is set Tuesday, Dec. 22, in Lawrenceburg, Tenn.
The prosecution of ”the fiddle man” in case No. 32518 is a grave injury to Mr. Hirsch, who plays fiddle at nursing homes and the local hospital on the Lord’s day and who runs a tiny church parking lot restoration service. The prosecution of this innocent traveler has put him under gigantic personal and financial pressure. His mailing address is below if you wish to send him any word of encouragement.
Mr. Hirsch, 65, is a weak vessel, no doubt. But God appears to be choosing him to make vital claims on our behalf about constitutional rights in Tennessee. If he wins the jury, wonderful for him. If he loses, the case is potentially wonderful for thousands in Tennessee who use the pubic right of way freely, without state permission, without driver licenses.
A ruling at the appellate level could restore a long-lost balance in the law, returning liberty to the people just as the Hicks ruling put limits on roadblocks. Most of these free travelers are immigrants from south of the Texas, California and Arizona borders. A few are principled people such as Mr. Hirsch and the Gnome of Strawberry Plains, heirs of an Anglo-Saxon sense of liberty who won’t buckle to custom and tribute no matter how often they are hauled into court.
State vs. Hirsch is a case of first impression because of the precision of its arguments and the thorough reading of the law by the defendant.
Other stories about “the fiddle man” of Lawrenceburg, Tenn.
His motion to dismiss deals briefly with charges touching on a pistol in his car, his lack of a driver license, his lack of insurance and his lack of auto registration.
He says he is operating outside of commerce, privately, and that he is not subject to any requirement to have state permission to run car or truck on the people’s highways. He argues that the state has “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” He’s saying the state is attacking someone it cannot legally see because he is not within its purview or jurisdiction.
Amended motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
Accused, Arthur Jay Hirsch, with appointed standby counsel, but on his own initiative, hereby amends his Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction in its entirety, and moves this Court to dismiss with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because of the following reasons:
Count 1 — suspended license
TCA 55-50-504. The Accused is charged with having suspended driving privilege (Virginia)
In 2003 the Accused researched and learned that the Virginia vehicle code is commercial in nature, i.e., the state has taxing and regulatory authority to license the privilege of transporting people or goods by motor vehicle on the public highways for hire in intrastate commerce.
Years before the Accused had ignorantly applied for and obtained a “drivers’ license” due to his misplaced confidence in authority figures who falsely told him he had to have one.
There is no evidence of record that the Accused has ever been engaged in regulated commercial activity on the public highways.
The Accused severed his ties with the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) by surrendering his drivers’ license card, and by giving verified notice of rescinding/revoking his signature on the license application for cause and by affidavit of mistake in support in 2003. (Exhibit A – copies of severance / termination documents).
There is no evidence of record that the DMV currently has any legitimate administrative authority over the Accused when traveling in his private conveyance on the public highways, enjoying and exercising his constitutionally secured God-given right to liberty / movement / locomotion / travel.
The prosecution has obtained from the Virginia DMV a driving record report on the Accused which false states that he has a suspended commercial driver license, notwithstanding his verified termination of his connection with the DMV as stated above.
Since 2003 the Accused has traveled freely on the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business in his private conveyance, and there is no evidence that he has applied for a “drivers’ license” in any state since then.
The Plaintiff’s indictment Count One does not allege that the Accused is engaged in regulated commercial activity on the public highways, and thus, would be duty-bound or subject to the TCA 55-50-504 charge, i.e., there is no alleged connection or nexus between the Accused and the Tennessee motor vehicle code. which makes it invalid due to failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 2 — pistol in car
TCA 39-17-1307(a)(1). The Accused is charged with carrying a weapon with intent to go armed. The police report narrative (Exhibit A) and the state’s witness’s sworn testimony reveal that the Accused’s weapon was not on his person on December 10, 2013.
The word “Carry/carrying” is not defined in the statute.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p.214, defines “carry” as “To have or bear upon or about one’s person, as a watch or weapon.”
That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime. (emphasis added)
The Tennessee Declaration of Rights, Article I, § 26 states that the “wearing of arms,” is the concern of the legislature.
Since there is no verified evidence of record that the Accused was “carrying, ” “bearing” or “wearing” a weapon on his person on December 10, 2013, it is meritless to allege that he “intended to go armed” and the charge is void.
The Plaintiff’s witness knew the facts regarding “carry” at the time of the Accused’s arrest, and at the time of his testifying before the grand jury, but nevertheless charged the Accused anyway in bad faith, and swore falsely to the jurors.
The facts do not support the Plaintiff’s charge; therefore, count two is baseless and void for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 3 — registration
TCA 55-4-101. Registration required before operation — Application — Issuance of registration and license plates — Rules and regulations — Temporary permit — Transfer of registration when changing vehicles — Fees — Safety rules for homemade trailers. The Accused is charged with driving an unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways.
The statute cited in Count Three is commercial nature, evidenced by TCA 55-4-101(a)(1) which states that the registration fee is a “privilege tax.”
The natural, unalienable, Creator-endowed right of liberty to freely travel is not taxable.
Application for state-granted commercial privilege status is a voluntary act per TCA 55-4-101c).
Count 3 does not allege that the Accused volunteered to apply for state-granted commercial privilege benefits which would have placed him under state regulation and taxation.
The term “motor vehicle” has a compound definition and is commercial in meaning.
Count 3 is presumptuously misapplied to the Accused, and is invalid because it fails to allege that the Accused is engaged in a state regulated commercial activity, i.e., transporting people or goods on the public highway by motor vehicle for hire.
Count 3 does not allege that the Accused is connected in equity to any government administrative agency or department through the filing of an application, and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 4 — no insurance
TCA 55-12-139. Compliance with financial responsibility law required — Evidence of compliance — Issuance of citations by police service technicians. The Accused is charged with violating the financial responsibility statute cited.
Count 4 statute cited is commercial in nature.
“Motor vehicle” is a compound commercial term.
Commerce is the transportation of people or goods by motor vehicle for hire on the public highways.
Count 4 presumes without supporting alleged facts that the Accused is engaged in commerce with a motor vehicle on the public highways.
Compelled contracts with insurance companies are conditional terms of receiving state-granted commercial driving privileges as reflected in the above cite.
The naturally inherent, God-given, unalienable rights of liberty to freely travel in one’s private capacity in the ordinary course of life and business in their own private conveyance, and the unalienable right to freely contract or refrain from contracting, are not subject to state regulation, interference, taxation or compelled contract.
Because Count 4 does not allege that the Accused is engaged in commerce and subject to the statute cited, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
THEREFORE, for the above reasons, the Accused, Arthur Jay Hirsch, shows that the indictment counts are misapplied to himself, are insufficient and invalid, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for Plaintiffs’ indictment counts that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and moves this Court to enter an order dismissing this case with prejudice. — Dec. 18, 2015
By Arthur Jay Hirsch, all God-given, unalienable rights reserved
Arthur Jay Hirsch
1029 W. Gaines St.
Lawrenceburg, TN 38464
P.O. Box 937
Franklin, TN 37065