Keelah Jackson of Chattanooga is a poor person under a civil death sentence. That is the state’s claims that it owns the roads that the people are forbidden to use them without its permission via the driver license under the state’s commercial driving license statute in the Tennessee transportation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. Title 55. In an attempt to escape poverty through the power of communication (another term for personal movement and the liberty of human interaction), she is making an appeal to city court judge Sherry Paty.
She is asking either for a restricted license, or for an agreed order recognizing her right to travel (not drive or operate) — to travel on the city’s streets. The order would act as her protection if she is stopped again and charged, as she was in 2014.
Petition for reconsideration for use of streets
This petition is a request for reconsideration in the matter of state of Tennessee vs Keelah Jackson. (City court case no. D27668)
The petition for a restricted driver license is made with the poverty of the petitioner in view, seeing that she has a status of pauper and does not have the means to pay into a payment plan a total of $800.
By Keelah Jackson
On Aug. 27, petitioner met with clerks Don Swafford and Stephanie Connor. Each indicated the only possibility allowed by the court under her first petition is entry into a payment plan and application for a full driver’s license for the full amount owed. For petitioner, this response is not a remedy.
Petitioner asks for a restricted driver license because she cannot afford a full license, and claims that poverty is her hardship.
Federal case with bearing on Jackson case
Petitioner asks the court to take notice of a decision July 2 of Nashville U.S. District Judge Aleta Trauger regarding the state’s practice of revoking driver’s licenses of people too poor to pay court fees cost and fines. She ruled the law and practice unconstitutional. James Thomas and David Hixson v. Bill Haslam et al, Case No. 3:17-cv-00005
“‘[D]riving an automobile’ is ‘a virtual necessity for most Americans.’ Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). *** Even solely on the basis of the undisputed facts and the basic features of life of which the court can take judicial notice, however, the substantial economic disadvantages associated with being unable lawfully to drive are apparent. Most obviously, being unable to drive in Tennessee limits the jobs available to a person and makes holding a job difficult once the person has it. ‘Automobile travel . . . is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home [and] workplace.’ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).” p. 39.
“When the State of Tennessee takes away a person’s right to drive, that person does not, suddenly and conveniently, stop having to go to medical appointments, stop having to report to court dates, or stop having to venture into the world to obtain food and necessities. Maybe public transportation will work for some of those activities some of the time, and maybe it will not. [Commissioner David] Purkey has offered nothing that would permit the court to conclude that public transportation can adequately fill the void left by the loss of a license, and indeed he stipulates, at a minimum, that ‘[p]ublic transportation is not available in some parts of Tennessee.’ *** Similarly, while some individuals with revoked licenses may be able to rely on family or charitable assistance for some purposes, there is no reason to conclude that such options will be available or adequate in most cases. What, then, is a person on a revoked license to do?” pp. 39-40.
“There is reason to believe that taking away a driver’s license is not merely out of proportion to the underlying purpose of ensuring payment, but affirmatively destructive of that end—so much so that whether section 40-24-105(b) can lay any claim to rationality is open to serious question.” p. 41.
This ruling intends to help poor people such as the petitioner. But the department of safety says petitioner cannot obtain relief from Judge Trauger’s ruling because her license is from Georgia.
She appears, thus, without remedy. “Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.” Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, 1955.
Notice to Chattanooga about citizens’ rights
As of Feb. 28, City of Chattanooga has been under transportation administrative notice that city government must obey Tenn. Code Ann. At Title 55. The notice tells what state law and federal law at USC 49 require of the city and how far its powers go to regulate use the roads. The notice describes the scope of the transportation laws that focuses on transportation, and thus the limits on city regulatory authority. Transportation is the profit-seeking, extraordinary use of the roads by people exercising a state privilege in the pursuit of private profit and gain.
“The business of using the public highways for profit, earned by transporting persons and property for hire, has been definitely excluded from the category of private or personal rights arising from citizenship. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have determined certain fundamental principles concerning the use of the highways. One is ‘that the primary use of the state highways is the use for private purposes; that no person is entitled to use the highways for gain as a matter of common right. *** The statute under consideration is a comprehensive regulation of the use of the state highway system by both common carriers and contract carriers.
It is designed *** to promote and preserve economically sound transportation, to regulate the burden of use to which the highways may be subjected, to protect the safety of the traveling public, and to protect the property of the state in the highways from unreasonable, improper, or excessive use.’” State v. Harris, 76 s.w.2d 324, 168 Tenn. 159 (1934). Transportation administrative notice, 21pp, p4. Exhibit 1.
The petitioner is a private user of the city’s streets. She is not involved in transportation. She does not use any car, truck or motorbike as a vehicle for hire. She’s not subject to the city’s transportation and vehicle-for-hire ordinance she subject to or liable for any duty under state or federal law. See affidavit of private use, 1pp. Exhibit 2.
In light of the above, the petitioner asks the court to issue a restricted license so that she might exercise her rights as described by Judge Trauger.
Or, in the alternative, petitioner requests this court issue an order consistent with the restatement of the law under administrative notice declaring she is not a commercial user, and that she travels in the city in a way that does not affect the public interest subject to regulation.
It would show that the court recognizes Jackson’s rights under the Tennessee and U.S. constitutions and rights not subject to statute. It would give her a way to escape poverty and serve as a proof of protection from any inquiring city officer. The order would let her assert her right to earn a living.
If this court has any questions, petitioner is happy to answer them in person.
Disapproved video — Jackson fights for liberty
Keelah Jackson asks city court to reconsider driver license case. She cites a Nashville federal court ruling overturning a rule letting the state revoke the driver licenses of people too poor to pay “court debt.” Miss Jackson also cites, in the alternative, transportation administrative notice and asks Judge Sherry Paty to recognize her right to travel by car in the exercise of her rights and private necessities.